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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY  
There are many ways to measure intergenerational mobility. One prominent approach is to measure the 
strength of the association between the lifetime earnings of fathers and that of their sons. This makes sense 
because lifetime earnings are such a fundamental aspect of economic wellbeing. Another strength of such 
measures is that they facilitate simple comparisons between countries, and of change over time for individual 
countries. The focus on males is a clear limitation of this approach. It does however avoid the complications 
associated with changing female labour force participation over time, and differences in female participation 
rates between countries. 
That said, the data required to directly estimate this association are simply not available for many countries, 
including Australia. Such data will be available eventually for Australia if the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics Australia (HILDA) panel survey continues to run. But for now, there is no available data source 
where the earnings of a representative sample of men can be matched to their fathers’ earnings, even for one 
point in time, let alone for the whole life course. 
In this context, one can impute fathers’ earnings on the basis of their occupation, which is observed. But this 
comes with major measurement error, which almost certainly biases the estimate towards zero due to 
attenuation bias. It also makes international comparisons problematic. To navigate this issue, one can use the 
same approach with U.S. data, for which the extent of bias will perhaps be similar, and then to adjust the 
Australian estimates by the extent to which the U.S. estimates differ from an external benchmark that is 
estimated using the best U.S. data available. This is the approach that underlies the international 
comparisons shown in Corak (2013). It is also the approach used by Leigh (2007) for Australia. 
In this paper, we generate up-to-date and internationally comparable estimates of the association between 
fathers’ and sons’ earnings. We closely follow Leigh’s approach, but we use considerably more data for 
Australia (twelve waves of HILDA) and for the USA (four waves of PSID). Our preferred estimate of 
intergenerational elasticity (0.35) is considerably higher than implied by Leigh’s study, and is less subject to 
sampling variation. This estimate implies that 10% higher earnings for a father are associated with 3.5% 
higher earnings for his son. In an international context, intergenerational mobility in Australia is not 
particularly high, and is consistent with its relatively high level of cross-sectional inequality. 
We also consider other summary indicators of mobility. For this we need to make a number of additional non-
trivial assumptions. We estimate the intergenerational correlation to be around 0.23. This is considerably 
smaller than the elasticity estimate, due to a major increase in earnings inequality over the last generation. 
We also show indicative estimated probabilities that a son achieves high (low) earnings, as a function of his 
father’s earnings. For example, consider a father whose earnings are at the 5th percentile. His son is four 
times more likely to have earnings in the bottom decile than in the top decile (17.8% compared to 4.3%). 
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Abstract 
We present new estimates of intergenerational earnings elasticity for Australia. We closely 
follow the methodology used by Leigh (2007), but use considerably more data (twelve waves 
of HILDA and four waves of PSID). Our adjusted estimates are intended to be comparable to 
those for other countries in Corak (2013). Our preferred estimate (0.35) is considerably higher 
than implied by Leigh’s study, and is less subject to sampling variation. In an international 
context, intergenerational mobility in Australia is not particularly high, and is consistent with 
its relatively high level of cross-sectional inequality. 
 
Keywords: earnings elasticity; intergenerational mobility; sampling variation; inequality; 
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1. Introduction
Economic inequality has been the subject of debate for centuries, with research and analyses 
spanning from the code of Hammurabi, to the contributions of Plato and Aristotle, St. Thomas 
Aquinas, J.J. Rousseau, J.S. Mill, and many others. Nowadays, inequality is considered as one of the 
most urgent social problems. The President of the United States and the Managing Director of the 
International Monetary Fund Christine Lagarde have declared that tackling raising inequality is a top 
priority (Atkinson, 2015). 
In debates on what can or should be done to address inequality, a key distinction is between 
equality of outcomes and equality of opportunities. Several political philosophers have discussed this 
distinction; including John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Amartya Sen, Ronald Dworkin, Richard Arneson, 
and G.A. Cohen (see Roemer and Trannoy, 2013 for a review). 
Inequality (of outcomes) has been rising in most countries for around 30 years. Public opinion 
surveys suggest a lack of consensus on whether inequality of outcomes is desirable (Atkinson, 2015). 
This is probably because economic outcomes are partly a function of effort, talent and preferences 
for work versus leisure and many believe that some differences in economic rewards are justifiable 
(Atkinson, 2015). American citizens have traditionally been willing to tolerate a higher level of 
inequality than people living in other developed Western countries, because many people at the 
bottom of the income distribution believe that they, or at least their children, will be able to climb 
the income ladder (Benabou and Ok, 2001). On the other hand, a recent survey suggests that 
Australians would prefer a greater level of equality, and that the perceived level of inequality is 
lower than the actual level of inequality (Doiron, 2012). 
Regardless of public opinion on its desirability, rising inequality has been linked to numerous 
instrumental concerns. In particular, there is evidence that rising inequality harms social cohesion, 
economic growth and, equality of opportunity (see OECD, 2015 and its references for a detailed 
discussion). 
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Egalitarian societies tend to be more socially cohesive, through lower levels of crime and higher 
levels of integration, and through social environments that are less hostile and more hospitable 
(Kawachi et al., 1997; Dunford, 2005). Some have argued that the link between inequality and social 
cohesion is a mechanism through which higher income inequality harms health, as measured by 
mortality and stress-related diseases (see for example Wilkinson, 2002, among others). 
The relationship between inequality and economic growth stems from limited opportunities for 
human capital investment for children at the lower levels of the socio-economic distribution 
(Cingano, 2014). The rise of income inequality between 1985 and 2005 has been estimated to 
reduce economic growth of the OECD area by almost 5 percentage points (OECD, 2015).   
The link between inequality of outcomes and opportunities has recently been studied intensely. 
Equality of opportunities is a concept frequently used in political speeches and public debates. 
Metaphors associated with this concept include “levelling the playing field” and “starting gate 
equality” (Roemer and Trannoy, 2013). Economic opportunities are partly determined by the 
circumstances of family background, such as parental education, occupation, marital status, region 
of birth – over which individuals have no control. Equality of opportunities is achieved when these 
factors do not play any role in achieving economic outcomes. Economists have engaged in debates 
around equality of opportunities for over three decades. John Roemer (1993, 1998) constructed an 
algorithm for analysing effectiveness of policies in equalizing opportunities for achieving a particular 
objective. Several empirical studies have estimated the extent to which opportunities are unequal in 
various countries (Roemer and Trannoy, 2013). 
Whilst equality of opportunity is difficult to directly operationalise and is not equivalent to 
intergenerational mobility, the two are closely related. In Corak’s words “if one number is to 
summarize the degree to which inequality is transmitted across the generations, just as sometimes 
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one number, like a Gini coefficient, is used to summarize the degree of inequality at a point in time, 
then the intergenerational elasticity is an appropriate statistic to use” (Corak, 2013: p. 83).2 
A clear cross-sectional relationship between inequality and intergenerational mobility has been 
found by several authors in cross-country analyses (Andrews and Leigh, 2009; Bjõrklund and Jäntti, 
2009; Blanden, 2013; Corak; 2006; 2013, Ermisch et al. 2012). This relationship was popularized by 
Alan Krueger in his role as a U.S. presidential adviser, dubbing it the ‘Great Gatsby Curve’. The ‘Great 
Gatsby Curve’ (reproduced in Figure 1 with our own estimate also included) depicts countries along 
two dimensions, income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) and intergenerational 
economic mobility (measured by the elasticity between paternal earnings and son’s earnings). 
Countries like Finland, Denmark and Norway show very low levels of inequality as well as a very 
small intergenerational elasticity of earnings. On the other hand, Italy, United Kingdom and United 
States are among the most unequal societies, and at the same time are characterised by a very high 
degree of transmission of economic advantage and disadvantage between fathers and sons. 
As suggested by Corak (2013), more income inequality in the present affects the mobility of young 
people, as family background is likely to play a bigger role in determining adult outcomes, while 
individual characteristics, such as ability, talent and hard work play a much smaller role. This concept 
has been expanded by the OECD in several policy documents, emphasising the idea that investments 
in promoting equality of opportunities, such as education policies, can foster higher economic 
mobility and, ultimately, economic growth (OECD, 2015). High levels of inequality have been found 
to have a strong negative effect on levels of education achieved, skills developed, and labour market 
outcomes of individuals from low-income families and therefore significantly increase inter-
generational education persistence (OECD, 2015).  
2 Some argue the merits of intergenerational correlation as a better measure of mobility than 
intergenerational elasticity (see for example Jäntti and Jenkins, 2014). Nevertheless, elasticity is the measure 
usually used in international comparisons. However, we also show estimates of intergenerational correlation 
in Section 5. 
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Inequality has been analysed and debated in Australia in many studies (Saunders, 2004; Leigh, 2013; 
Wilkins 2014, among many others). Despite a general belief that Australia is an egalitarian society, 
international comparisons suggest that Australia’s level of inequality is slightly higher than the OECD 
average (OECD, 2015). There are far fewer studies of Australian intergenerational mobility. Of these, 
Leigh (2007) has been the most influential, and has been used as the basis of numerous 
intergenerational comparisons (D’Addio, 2007; Ichino et al., 2011; Blanden, 2013; Corak, 2013). 
Leigh’s estimate suggests that Australia is particularly mobile, given its level of inequality. Figure 1 
(Corak’s version of the Great Gatsby curve) shows Australia as an outlier when Leigh’s estimate is 
used.3 
We follow Leigh’s approach closely in deriving estimates of intergenerational earnings’ elasticity, but 
we use considerably more data, yielding more precise estimates. Specifically, we use twelve waves 
(2001-2012) of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics Australia (HILDA) survey rather than 
one to construct raw Australian estimates. Importantly, Wave 4 (2004), which Leigh used, yields an 
elasticity estimate that is lower than for any other wave apart from Wave 1. We also use four waves 
(2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007) of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) study rather than one. 
Our estimated elasticity (0.35) is about 34% larger than implied by Leigh’s study, and is less subject 
to sampling variation. This suggests that Australia’s level of mobility is consistent with its level of 
inequality. And economic mobility in Australia is not particularly high in an international context. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews previous Australian work on 
intergenerational mobility. Section 3 outlines methods and data. Section 4 presents the main results. 
Section 5 presents some additional results, including the intergenerational correlation and the 
3 Andrews and Leigh (2009) present the first version of the ‘Great Gatsby Curve’ of which we are aware. In 
their results, Australia does not have an outlying low intergenerational elasticity. Indeed, the elasticity is 
slightly higher than the fitted value based on its level of inequality. However, the results in that paper do not 
seem to have been influential in the subsequent literature, possibly due to the limitations of the data used.  
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probabilities of moving between specific parts of the earnings distribution between generations. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Previous Australian Work on Inequality and Intergenerational
Mobility
There is a substantial empirical literature on inequality in Australia. Recent contributions include 
Saunders (2004), Johnson and Wilkins (2006), Saunders and Bradbury (2006), Atkinson and Leigh 
(2007), Doiron (2012), Leigh (2013), Whiteford (2013) and Wilkins (2014). Many of these studies 
document rising inequality over time. Factors contributing to this increase include demographic 
changes, labour market trends, earning gaps, education inequality, and the disparity between the 
income share of the individuals at the top of the income distribution and the rest of the population 
(Atkinson and Leigh, 2007; Doiron, 2012; Leigh, 2013; Whiteford, 2013). Some studies have 
considered the roles the tax and transfer system (Whiteford, 2013), the role of housing (Siminski and 
Saunders, 2004; Saunders and Siminski, 2005), and the role of non-cash government benefits (e.g. 
Garfinkel et al., 2006). 
The emergence of high quality panel data has enabled studies of short-run (year-to-year) mobility. 
Wilkins and Warren (2012) use HILDA to analyse income mobility between 2001 and 2009. They 
show that, on average, individuals moved slightly more than two deciles in that period, and over 
55% of people that were in the bottom quintile in 2001, remained in the same quintile in 2009. A 
similar proportion did not move from the top quintile of the income distribution (46%). Overall, few 
people moved by more than one quintile in the analysed period of time. 
However, very limited work has linked income inequality to intergenerational mobility (Andrews and 
Leigh, 2009; Leigh, 2013) and the analysis of transmission of economic advantage between 
generations of Australians has received little attention, especially from economists. Most of the 
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existing research comes from literature in sociology, which has focused on mobility across 
occupations, rather than earnings, and on the determinants of this phenomenon. Some examples 
are Marks and McMillan (2003), Chester (2015), Redmond et al. (2014). 
Cobb-Clark (2010) presents evidence from the Youth in Focus project, a large project on the 
intergenerational transmission of disadvantage, and looks in particular at the transmission of income 
support across generations. Research based on Youth in Focus has shown that young people who 
grew up in families that receive intense income support are more likely to engage in risky behaviours 
(Cobb-Clark et al., 2012), have low education and various health problems (e.g. asthma or 
depression), and these factors are likely to have a negative effect on people’s income. 
Leigh (2007) calculates intergenerational earnings elasticity combining four surveys conducted in 
1965, 1973, 1987 and 2001-2004 and using parental occupation to predict earnings, and compares 
the level of intergenerational income mobility in the 2000s with the degree observed in the 1960s, 
and with socio-economic mobility observed in the United States. This work suggests that 
intergenerational earnings elasticity in Australia has been relatively constant over time and is likely 
to be in the range of 0.2- 0.3. This is similar to estimates for other OECD countries such as New 
Zealand, Canada and Sweden, which have substantially higher intergenerational earnings mobility 
than other countries such as Italy, the US and the UK (d’Addio, 2007).  
In a recent study, Huang et al. (2015) use HILDA and the Longitudinal Labour Force Survey (LLFS) in a 
two-stage panel regression model. They estimate the intergenerational earnings elasticity in 
Australia for the period 2001-2013 to lie between 0.11 and 0.30. The major limitation of their 
approach is to not address the issue of attenuation bias stemming from measurement error that 
comes with imputing father’s income (father’s income is not directly observed in any available 
Australian data source). This implies that their elasticity estimates are likely to be severely biased 
towards zero and are not internationally comparable. Our own approach to deal with this form of 
bias, drawing on Leigh (2007) and Corak (2006, 2013), is detailed below. 
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3. Methods and Data
Intergenerational earnings elasticity is a simple and commonly used indicator of the 
intergenerational persistence of economic advantage. Given microdata on earnings for a 
representative sample of adult males and for their fathers, intergenerational elasticity β can be 
estimated from the following regression model:  
ln𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼 + β ln𝑌𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑒𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖, (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖
𝑠𝑠𝑠 is a measure of the (usually hourly) earnings of each working-age male i and 𝑌𝑖
𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑒𝑒 is a
measure of earnings for the father of each member of the sample. A larger elasticity indicates 
greater intergenerational persistence. For example, an elasticity of 0.4 suggests that a 10% increase 
in a father’s earnings is associated with a 4% increase in his son’s earnings. An elasticity of zero 
would suggest that individual earnings are unrelated to their father’s earnings. The focus on males is 
motivated by concerns over the complications related to female selection into labour market 
participation, including differences in participation rates over time and between countries. 
Ideally, the measure of earnings (for both fathers and sons) used is ‘permanent’ earnings – i.e. a 
measure which summarises earnings capacity across each person’s entire working life. Whilst 
conceptually straightforward, the estimation of such elasticities is complicated by measurement 
issues and data availability. To estimate permanent earnings, longitudinal data are required which 
follow two generations across their entire working lives. Such data are available for few countries. 
But estimates which rely on a single observation of father’s current earnings are likely to suffer badly 
from attenuation bias (i.e. bias towards zero). This is due to two factors which both lead to 
measurement error in fathers’ earnings. The first factor is the strong systematic variation in earnings 
over the life cycle. Recorded fathers’ earnings at a point in time strongly depend on the age of the 
father at that time. The second source of measurement error is transitory variation in current 
earnings, which again leads to attenuation bias.  
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In the Australian context (as for many other countries), adequate data do not exist to directly 
estimate intergenerational earnings elasticity – not even with a single observation of father’s 
earnings, let alone for permanent earnings. 4 Given this, a common strategy in this literature is to 
estimate the elasticity using the best available alternative approach for the country of interest and 
also for the United States using a comparable approach. Whilst both estimates are flawed, they are 
arguably comparable and hence the relative extent of intergenerational mobility can be inferred. 
Finally, the estimate for Australia is re-scaled in an attempt to account for the apparent bias due to 
the inferior data. This scaling factor is equal to an externally derived benchmark elasticity estimate 
for the USA, divided by the estimate derived for the USA using the inferior approach that was also 
adopted to derive the Australian estimate. This approach is now described in further detail, as 
applied for our Australian estimates. 
Given the characteristics of Australian data, a credible strategy is to impute each father’s earnings on 
the basis of their reported occupation, since occupation data are available as will be described 
below. Following Leigh (2007), the coefficients of the following model can be estimated using a 
cross-sectional sample of sons: 
ln𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛉′𝐎𝐎𝐎𝒊 + 𝜋1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖 + 𝜋2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖2 + 𝐴𝑖 , (2) 
Where Occ is a vector of mutually exclusive occupational category indicators. The estimated 
coefficients from this regression are then used to impute earnings for each father (ln Y𝚤𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑒𝑒� ) on
4 Sons’ and fathers’ earnings are both directly observed in HILDA only for those who were co-residing in at 
least one wave of the survey, and both have reported earnings in at least one wave. Given the relatively short 
length of the HILDA panel, there are few such cases. It would be possible to select a sample of younger sons 
(say, men aged 25-29) whose own earnings are observed in later waves and whose fathers are also included in 
the respondent sample. Direct estimates of intergenerational elasticity could be calculated for such a sample. 
Such estimates would be subject to large sampling variability due to the small sample size, and they may not 
be indicative of intergenerational mobility for the broader population. This strategy has not been pursued 
here, but it will become more attractive as HILDA continues to mature. 
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the basis of the fathers’ occupation. Father’s age is held constant at 40 in the imputation in order to 
remove any life-cycle variation from the measure of father’s earnings. That is, 
ln Y𝚤𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑒𝑒� = 𝛼� + 𝛉�𝐎𝐎𝐎𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑒𝑒 + 𝜋�140 + 𝜋�21600 , (3) 
using the estimated parameters (𝛼�, 𝛉�, 𝜋�1 and 𝜋�2 ) from (2). This imputed value (ln Y𝚤𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑒𝑒� ) is then
used as a regressor in the intergenerational earnings regression. Since a credible measure of 
permanent child earnings is also unavailable, current earnings is used. And since current earnings are 
recorded at various ages, we also control for a quadratic in sons’ age to improve precision and to 
remove any bias caused by a correlation between child’s age and father’s occupation. The estimating 
equation is therefore: 
ln𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼 + β ln Y𝚤𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑒𝑒� + 𝛾1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾2(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠)2 + 𝜀𝑖, (4) 
ln Y𝚤𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑒𝑒�  should be seen as a crude approximation of fathers’ earnings. Its derivation assumes that
the occupational earnings structure amongst the sample of children is the same as the occupational 
earnings structure a generation earlier. It also ignores: variation in earnings within occupation; 
changes in occupation across fathers’ life course; and possible misreporting of fathers’ occupation. 
Direct use of this measure, for example in intergenerational transition matrices, should be done very 
cautiously and arguably should be avoided completely. But if the same approach is used to generate 
corresponding US estimates, then perhaps the bias will be similar for both countries. The adjusted 
estimate for Australia (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴) is thus: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼� 𝐴𝐴𝐴 =  ?̂?𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝛽�𝑈𝑈𝑈 (5) 
This estimate of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴 can be compared to published estimates derived by Corak (2013) for 
numerous other countries, if one uses the same 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑏ℎ𝑚𝑓𝑒𝑚 as used by Corak, which is 0.473, 
based on Grawe’s (2004) estimate.  
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Whilst there is a substantial literature which uses such methods, the issue of statistical inference has 
arguably been insufficiently discussed. The appropriate method for calculating standard errors for 
𝐼𝐼𝐼� 𝐴𝐴𝐴 perhaps depends on its purpose. ?̂?𝐴𝐴𝐴 and ?̂?𝐴𝐴𝐴 are both subject to sampling variation. 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑏ℎ𝑚𝑓𝑒𝑚 was also estimated in an empirical study and that estimate is itself subject to 
sampling variation. If one is primarily interested in the size of 𝐼𝐼𝐼� 𝐴𝐴𝐴, then all three sources of 
sampling variation should be taken into account in deriving its standard error. However, we argue 
that the absolute magnitude of this estimate is not of primary importance. More important is how it 
compares with those of other countries. Therefore we treat 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑏ℎ𝑚𝑓𝑒𝑚 as an arbitrary scalar 
(which was applied to each of Corak’s estimates for various countries). For this reason, we show 
standard errors that account for the variance of both ?̂?𝐴𝐴𝐴 and ?̂?𝐴𝐴𝐴, but not the variance in the 
estimate of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑏ℎ𝑚𝑓𝑒𝑚. The standard error of 𝐼𝐼𝐼� 𝐴𝐴𝐴 is derived using a ‘delta-method’ 
approach, which draws on a first-order Taylor Series expansion to estimate the variance of the ratio 
of two independent random variables: 𝑉𝑉𝑉 �
𝛽�1
𝛽�2
� = 𝑉𝑓𝑒�𝛽�1�
𝛽�2
2 + 𝛽�12𝑉𝑓𝑒�𝛽�2�𝛽�24   Standard errors for 
the Australian and US estimates which draw on pooled data (across waves) also account for 
clustering within individuals. 
The Australian component of the analysis draws on the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) Survey, which is a representative longitudinal study of the Australian population 
that commenced in 2001. A total of 13,969 individuals in 7,682 households were interviewed in 
wave 1 through a combination of face-to-face interviews and self-completion questionnaires, for all 
members of households aged 15 years old and over. Members of households included in wave 1 
have subsequently been survey annually, along with any new members of any households which 
they form. A general top-up sample of around 2000 new households was added in 2011 (Wave 11).  
The results for the United States are derived using the same methods, applied to the 2001, 2003, 
2005 and 2007 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is the longest running 
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longitudinal household survey in the world. This study began in 1968 with a sample of over 18,000 
individuals living in 5,000 families and selected to be representative of the United States population. 
The PSID followed these individuals and their descendants.  The initial PSID sample also included a 
low-income oversample from the Survey of Economic Opportunities (SEO). We followed Lee and 
Solon (2006) and Leigh (2007) and excluded this sample from our analysis. In 1990 and 1992, a 
Latino sample was added to the PSID, and in 1997 and 1999, an immigrant sample was added. 
Following Leigh (2007), these additional samples were included in our analysis. Consistent with the 
analysis conducted in Leigh (2007), we used the Cross-National Equivalent File version of the PSID 
(see Burkhauser et al., 2001 for an explanation of the background of the CNEF) and merged it with 
the information from PSID where respondents were asked for their fathers’ occupation when they 
were growing up. Occupations were 3-digit codes, using the 1970 occupational coding system and 
fathers were spread across 465 occupations. The analysis used individual labour earnings (coded as 
i11110 by the CNEF), divided by hours worked. 
For both the Australian and US analysis, responding person sampling weights are applied and the 
sample is limited to men (sons) aged between 25 and 54 years of age, with positive earnings. Also 
excluded are observations which have a non-positive sampling weight, and those with missing 
occupation or missing father’s occupation. 
In HILDA, the full sample of 25-54 years old men is 44,952 observations across waves. Of these, 
15,421 have no recorded earnings (due mainly to self-employment and non-employment). Of the 
remaining sample, 2,520 have no recorded father’s occupation and an additional 139 have a non-
positive sampling weight. After applying the exclusions, we are left with 26,872 observations in the 
estimation sample, or 60% of all 25-54 males in the full HILDA sample. 
In PSID, the full sample of 25-54 years old men is 12,259 observations across waves. After excluding 
individuals without recorded earnings, father’s occupation or sample waves, we are left with 5,767 
observations, or 47% of all 25-54 males in the full PSID sample. 
11
4. Results
The main results are conveyed in Figure 2. Table 2 shows these same results in more detail. The 
upper panel of Figure 2 shows raw estimates of the intergenerational earnings elasticity using each 
wave in HILDA separately and with all waves pooled. These are estimated using the imputed father’s 
earnings approach.5,6 The far-right data point is the preferred estimate, derived from the pooled 
sample, shown with a robust 95% confidence Interval that accounts for within-individual error 
correlation. This pooled estimate (0.227) is 30% higher than the Wave 4 estimate (0.174).  
The middle panel shows comparable estimates for the USA using the PSID. These are estimated 
using the 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007 waves individually, and with the four waves pooled.7 Our 
sample size is around four times larger than Leigh’s (2007) in each wave, or sixteen times larger 
overall.8 Our estimates vary little between waves. Our preferred estimate is 0.306, from the pooled 
analysis. 
5 The estimates derived from the pooled sample use a within-wave imputation of fathers’ earnings (i.e. for 
each observation, the imputed father’s wage was the same in the pooled analysis as it was in the analysis of 
each wave individually.) The pooled regression is augmented with wave fixed effects to account for any 
systematic changes between waves in sons’ earnings. 
6 There is a slight discrepancy in the results we show for 2004 (0.174) and Leigh’s published estimate (0.181). 
This is mostly explained by a change in the occupational classification within HILDA. Leigh’s analysis uses the 4-
digit ASCO 1997 classification. This classification is not available subsequent to the 2006 wave of data. Instead 
we use 4-digit ANZSCO 2006, which is available for all waves. However, when we use ASCO 1997, the estimate 
for 2004 increases to 0.178. The remaining discrepancy (0.003) is likely due to revisions to the data that are 
applied between HILDA releases. 
7 Later PSID waves are not yet available in CNEF.
8 In personal correspondence, Dr Leigh indicated that he restricted the PSID sample to the cohort born 
between 1951 and 1959. This was for consistency with Solon (1992), which he used as the benchmark U.S. 
estimate. We do not make this sample restriction because we think that consistency in the analysis of HILDA 
and PSID is of first-order importance. The comparison between the raw Australian estimate and the similarly-
derived U.S. estimate determines Australia’s elasticity estimate relative to those for other countries shown in 
Corak (2013). In practice, this discrepancy in sample selection criteria is not a major factor, since our estimates 
for PSID are not markedly different to Leigh’s, especially for 2001. 
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The higher estimates for the pooled HILDA analysis, combined with the lower estimates for the 
pooled PSID analysis suggest that intergenerational elasticity in Australia is more similar to the USA 
than implied by Leigh’s estimates. However, the new estimate for the USA remains 35% larger than 
for Australia, and the difference is statistically significant (p = 0.049). 
The lower panel of Figure 2 shows the HILDA estimates for each wave after applying the Corak-style 
(2006; 2013) adjustment (described in Section 3), which draws on our pooled PSID elasticity estimate 
of 0.306 instead of Leigh’s 0.325. The 95% Confidence Intervals shown are based on a standard error 
calculation which accounts for the variance of both the HILDA and PSID estimates.  
These results suggest that Australia’s intergenerational elasticity is considerably higher than previous 
studies. Our preferred estimate (0.35) is the pooled estimate, since it draws on the most data and 
hence is less subject to sampling error. This is close to the fitted line in Figure 1, and is 34% larger 
than Corak’s published estimate drawing on Leigh. This means that 10% higher earnings for a father 
are associated with 3.5% higher earnings for his son. 
5. Other Measures of Mobility
Our main focus has been to estimate the intergenerational earnings elasticity for Australia. This is 
primarily motivated by a desire for a summary measure that is easily compared to those for other 
countries. We now consider how our estimate translates to other meaningful summary indicators of 
mobility. To do this, we need to make a number of reasonable, but non-trivial assumptions. 
Some argue that intergenerational correlation is a better summary measure than elasticity, if 
earnings inequality has changed considerably between generations (Jantti and Jenkins, 2013). The 
intergenerational correlation more directly summarises to a child’s ability to move up (or down) the 
earnings distribution with respect to their ranking in the distribution. A relatively high elasticity, on 
the other hand, may reflect an increase in the dispersion of the earnings distribution between 
generations.  
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The intergenerational correlation (𝜌) can be expressed as: 
𝜌 = β 𝜎𝑓
𝜎𝑠
(6) 
Where β is the intergenerational elasticity of the logarithm of permanent earnings, 𝜎𝑓 is the 
standard deviation of permanent earnings in the father’s generation, and 𝜎𝑠 is the standard 
deviation of permanent earnings in the son’s generation. We do not have data on the distribution of 
permanent earnings for fathers so we cannot calculate 𝜌 directly. However there is evidence that 
male earnings inequality has increased markedly over the period of interest. In fact, Coelli and 
Borland’s (2016) estimates suggest that the standard deviation of log earnings increased by around 
50% over this generation.9 For our calculations we assume that this also applies to permanent 
earnings.10 Drawing on equation (6), we thus estimate the intergenerational earnings correlation (𝜌) 
to equal  β
𝜎𝑓
𝜎𝑠
= 0.35 𝜎𝑓
1.5𝜎𝑓 = 0.35 11.5 = 0.233.
Also of interest is the probability that a son achieves high (low) earnings, as a function of his father’s 
earnings. Again, it is not possible to examine this directly with available data. But we can make a 
reasonable attempt at this following the approach of Solon (1989; 1992). This approach only 
requires an estimate of the intergenerational correlation, under the assumption that log permanent 
earnings in the two generations are bivariate normally distributed. As discussed by Solon (1992) this 
assumption does not allow for the extent of upward mobility to differ from the extent of downward 
mobility. Nevertheless, it allows for reasonable suggestive estimates. 
9 Coelli and Borland (2016) show time series of summary statistics for the distribution of earnings for full time 
male workers for 1975 to 2011. Their estimates suggest that the log 90/50 percentile log wage gap increased 
by around 50% over a generation, similarly for the log 90/50 percentile log wage gap. This is approximately 
equivalent to a 50% increase in the standard deviation of the log earnings distribution as well. 
10 This seems to be a reasonable assumption, but it is not trivial. It is possible that the increase in cross-
sectional earnings inequality reflects a greater variance in the transitory (rather than the permanent) 
component of earnings – although Coelli and Borland’s (2016) restriction to full time workers perhaps lessens 
this concern. 
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Key results of this exercise are shown in Table 3. Corresponding estimates based on Leigh’s elasticity 
estimate are also shown for comparative purposes. Columns (1) and (2) show the assumed 
intergenerational elasticities and correlations, respectively. The remaining columns show the 
estimated probability for a son’s permanent earnings to lie in a given interval of the population 
distribution. 
Panel A shows estimates for sons whose fathers’ earnings were at the 5th percentile of the 
distribution. Our estimates suggest that the almost two thirds (65.3%) of such sons had earnings in 
the bottom half of the distribution (Column 5). They also suggest that the probability of these sons’ 
earnings being in the lowest decile is 17.8%, more than four times larger than probability of being in 
the top decile (4.3%). Using Leigh’s estimate, the corresponding probabilities are 15.3% and 5.7%, or 
2.7 times higher. 
Panel B shows similar estimates for sons whose father’s earnings were at the 20th percentile of the 
distribution. The probability of the son’s earnings being in the lowest decile is 13.2%, more than 
twice as high as the probability of being in the top decile (6.4%). Using Leigh’s estimate, the 
corresponding probabilities are 12.3% and 7.5%, or 1.7 times higher. 
The results for sons of fathers whose earnings lie at the median of the distribution are in Panel C. 
Due to the intergenerational correlation in earnings, these sons are slightly less likely than average 
to be in the top or bottom decile of the distribution (9.4% in each case). 
The results for fathers at the 80th and 95th percentiles (Panels D and E) are symmetrical to those in 
Panels A and B, due to the assumed bivariate normal distribution. 
6. Conclusion
This study has analysed intergenerational mobility in Australia, and has generated new estimates of 
earnings elasticity using HILDA data. We have updated the estimates of Leigh (2007) by following the 
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same approach but using considerably more data, yielding more precise estimates. Specifically, we 
used twelve waves (2001-2012) of HILDA, rather than one, to construct estimates of 
intergenerational mobility and we also use four waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
study rather than one.  
Our analysis is performed by imputing father’s earnings on the basis of their reported occupation, 
since detailed occupation data are available in HILDA. The estimates for Australia are re-scaled in 
order to account for likely attenuation bias due to the imputation. The scaling factor is constructed 
in a way that makes the estimates comparable to those estimated by Corak (2013) for other 
countries. We have also proposed an approach to statistical inference that is appropriate for 
international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity. 
Our preferred estimate for the intergenerational earnings elasticity in Australia is 0.35, which is 
considerably higher than the estimate in Leigh (2007), which was in turn the basis of Corak’s (2013) 
estimate. Our higher estimate is consistent with Australia’s level of income inequality, as depicted in 
the so-called ‘Great Gatsby Curve’ (Figure 1). It suggests that a 10 percent increase in father’s 
earnings is associated with a 3.5 percent increase in son’s earnings. Combining this result with the 
estimates reported in Corak (2013), we conclude that Australia is not particularly mobile in an 
international context. It is less mobile than the Scandinavian countries, as well as Germany, Canada 
and New Zealand, but is more mobile than the United States and the United Kingdom. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Mean SD 
HILDA (2001-2012) 
son's age 39.27 8.51 
son's hourly earnings (A$) 28.21 17.80 
father's predicted hourly earnings (A$) 25.59 11.27 
N 26,872 
 PSID (2001-2007) 
son's age 38.96 8.79 
son's hourly earnings (US$) 26.05 66.16 
father's predicted hourly earnings 
(US$)  22.59  12.23 
N 5,767 
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Table 2 Elasticity Estimates 
HILDA - unadjusted 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 pooled 
estimated elasticity 0.171 0.222 0.192 0.174 0.230 0.305 0.249 0.185 0.236 0.235 0.261 0.272 0.227 
standard error 0.032 0.039 0.031 0.048 0.034 0.049 0.036 0.044 0.043 0.038 0.037 0.043 0.020 
N 2,498 2,328 2,206 2,139 2,129 2,087 2,034 1,947 2,057 2,077 2,713 2,657 26,872 
 PSID 
estimated elasticity 0.315 0.309 0.293 0.314 0.306 
standard error 0.070 0.050 0.047 0.043 0.035 
N 1,404 1,363 1,515 1,485 5,767 
 HILDA - adjusted 
estimated elasticity 0.265 0.343 0.296 0.269 0.355 0.472 0.385 0.285 0.365 0.363 0.404 0.421 0.350 
standard error 0.057 0.072 0.058 0.080 0.066 0.093 0.070 0.074 0.078 0.071 0.073 0.082 0.050 
Notes: This table shows various estimated intergenerational elasticities. The upper panel shows estimates for Australia using each wave of HILDA individually and in a 
pooled analysis. Father’s income is imputed on the basis of reported father’s occupation. Panel B shows comparable estimates for the United States. Panel C shows the 
HILDA results after applying an adjustment factor consistent with Corak’s (2013) approach. The 95% Confidence Intervals shown are robust to heteroscedasticity and to 
clustering within individuals for the estimates where waves are pooled. The Confidence intervals shown in Panel C account for sampling variation in the (unadjusted) HILDA 
estimates and the sampling variation in the PSID estimates (The PSID estimates are used in the construction of the adjustment factor as described in the text). 
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Table 3 Estimated probabilities that son’s earnings lie in specific intervals as a function of percentile of father's earnings 
Inter-
generational 
elasticity 
(1) 
Inter-
generational 
correlation 
(2) 
Estimated probabilities for son's earnings 
P(lowest 
decile) 
(3) 
P(lowest 
quintile) 
(4) 
p(above 
median) 
(5) 
p(highest 
quintile) 
(6) 
p(highest 
decile) 
(7) 
 
A: father at 5th percentile 
Using Leigh's elasticity 
estimate     0.25   0.167 15.3% 28.3% 39.1% 12.9% 5.7% 
Using our elasticity estimate     0.35   0.233 17.8% 31.9% 34.7% 10.4% 4.3% 
 
B: father at 20th percentile 
Using Leigh's elasticity 
estimate     0.25   0.167 12.3% 23.9% 44.3% 16.0% 7.5% 
Using our elasticity estimate     0.35   0.233 13.2% 25.4% 42.0% 14.3% 6.4% 
 
C: father at 50th percentile 
Using Leigh's elasticity 
estimate     0.25   0.167 9.7% 19.7% 50.0% 19.7% 9.7% 
Using our elasticity estimate     0.35   0.233 9.4% 19.4% 50.0% 19.4% 9.4% 
 
D: father at 80th percentile 
Using Leigh's elasticity 
estimate     0.25   0.167 7.5% 16.0% 55.7% 23.9% 12.3% 
Using our elasticity estimate     0.35   0.233 6.4% 14.3% 58.0% 25.4% 13.2% 
 
E: father at 95th percentile 
Using Leigh's elasticity 
estimate     0.25   0.167 5.7% 12.9% 61.0% 28.3% 15.3% 
Using our elasticity estimate     0.35   0.233 4.3% 10.4% 65.3% 31.9% 17.8% 
Notes: Columns (3) – (7) show estimated probabilities for a son’s permanent earnings to lie in specific intervals of the 
earnings distribution, as a function of his father’s ranking in the earnings distribution. The estimates draw on Solon’s 
(1989; 1992) method, which relies on the non-trivial assumption that fathers’ and sons’ earnings follow a bivariate 
normal distribution, which for example does not allow the extent of upward mobility to differ from the extent of 
downward mobility. The intergenerational correlation estimates which underpin these estimates are shown in 
column (2). These are a function of the elasticity estimates (column 1) and changes in cross-sectional earnings 
inequality between generations, as shown equation (6). Our calculations draw on the time series of cross-sectional 
earnings inequality in Coelli and Borland (2016), as detailed in footnote (9).  
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Figure 1 The ‘Great Gatsby Curve’ 
Source: Corak (2013: Figure 1) and our estimate 
(Corak, 2013, based on 
Leigh, 2007)
Australia (our estimate)
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Figure 2 Estimates of Intergenerational Elasticity in Australia and the USA 
Panel A: HILDA (unadjusted) 
Panel B: PSID - Using Comparable Approach 
Panel C: HILDA – With Corak-Style Adjustment 
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Notes: This figure shows various estimated intergenerational elasticities. Panel A shows estimates for Australia using 
each wave of HILDA individually and in a pooled analysis. Father’s income is imputed on the basis of reported 
father’s occupation. Panel B shows comparable estimates for the United States. Panel C shows the HILDA results 
after applying an adjustment factor consistent with Corak’s (2013) approach. The 95% Confidence Intervals shown 
are robust to heteroscedasticity and to clustering within individuals for the estimates where waves are pooled. The 
Confidence intervals shown in Panel C account for sampling variation in the (unadjusted) HILDA estimates and the 
sampling variation in the PSID estimates (The PSID estimates are used in the construction of the adjustment factor as 
described in the text).  
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